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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Children’s  testimony  is often  the  only  evidence  of alleged  abuse.  Thus,  the  importance  of  conducting
forensic  interviews  that  are  free  from  bias  and  misleading  information  is immense,  as  these  could  lead  to
false  reports.  In the  current  paper,  we review  unexpected  ﬁndings  in children’s  suggestibility  that  illus-
trate  the difﬁculty  in  distinguishing  between  false  and  accurate  reports.  We  explore  situations  in  which  a
younger  person’s  memory  account  may  be  more  accurate  than  that  of  an adult,  when  a  single suggestive
interview  may  be as detrimental  as  multiple  interviews,  and  when  children  can  make  inaccurate  reports
spontaneously.  We  conclude  with  recommendations  for interviewers  to  decrease  false  reporting  by  both
children  and adults.
©  2015  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  on  behalf  of  Colegio  Oﬁcial  de  Psicólogos  de  Madrid.  This
is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Investigación  acerca  de  la  sugestionabilidad  infantil:  lo  que  se  debe  saber  antes
de  entrevistar  a  un  nin˜o
alabras clave:
xactitud del testimonio infantil
ugestionabilidad
esgo del entrevistador
ntrevista sugerida
actores demográﬁcos
r  e  s  u  m  e  n
El  testimonio  de  los  nin˜os  es a menudo  la  única  evidencia  de  un  supuesto  abuso.  Por  lo  tanto,  la  importan-
cia  de la realización  de entrevistas  forenses  que estén  libres  de  prejuicios  y de información  engan˜osa  es
inmensa,  ya  que  podrían  dar  lugar  a informes  falsos.  En  el presente  trabajo  se revisan  los  hallazgos  ines-
perados  en  la investigación  sobre  de  la  sugestionabilidad  infantil  que  ilustra  la diﬁcultad  de  diferenciar
los  informes  falsos  de  los  verdaderos.  Se  analizan  casos  en  donde  las declaraciones  de  memoria  de  una
persona  más  joven  pueden  ser  más  precisas  que  las  de  un  adulto,  cuando  una  sola  entrevista  sugeridaactores cognitivos
actores psicosociales puede ser  tan  perjudicial  como  múltiples  entrevistas  y cuando  los  nin˜os  pueden  hacer  declaraciones
inexactas  de  forma  espontánea.  Concluimos  con  unas  recomendaciones  a  los  entrevistadores  para  que
reduzcan  las  declaraciones  falsas  de  nin˜os  y  adultos.
©  2015  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  en  nombre  de  Colegio  Oﬁcial  de  Psicólogos  de  Madrid.During the investigation and prosecution of child abuse cases,
hildren are often the key witnesses (and may  be the only eye-
itness) to alleged crimes. In particular, their verbal testimony
ay  be the only evidence of abuse that is presented in court as
∗ Corresponding author. Cornell University. Department of Human Development.
thaca, NY, USA.
E-mail address: ach34@cornell.edu (A.C. Hritz).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apj.2014.09.002
133-0740/© 2015 Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. on behalf of Colegio Oﬁcial de Ps
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Este es un  artículo  Open  Access  bajo la  licencia  CC  BY-NC-ND
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
physical evidence of abuse is often limited or non-existent. How-
ever, prior research has shown that children’s testimony may be
inaccurate due to a susceptibility to false memory, in particular
false memory resulting from suggestion (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Ceci
& Friedman, 2000). Because the child’s testimony is so important
and may  be the only evidence of the alleged abuse, the quality of
this evidence must be protected from contamination by sugges-
tive interviewing. Proper interviewing techniques must be utilized
to safeguard children’s testimony from the effect of misinformation
icólogos de Madrid. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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nd suggestibility, as these could lead to false reports. In the current
aper, we review unexpected ﬁndings in children’s suggestibility
esearch and make recommendations for interviewers to decrease
alse reporting by both children and adults.
Before getting to this, however, we deﬁne some terms. By false
eport we are referring to claims made by a child that are factually
naccurate, but the inaccuracy can be due to conscious lies on the
art of the child or to unconscious assimilation of false suggestions
nd pressures made by those (usually adults) who have access to
he child. The difference between these two forms of false report
s that the one due to lying can potentially be remediated–by per-
uading the child to tell the truth; however, a false report that is the
esult of a child incorporating an interviewer’s false suggestion is
heoretically irremediable. Once the suggestion gets implanted in
he memory trace, it is forever altered and no amount of remedial
nterviewing can undo the damage.
The other term we deﬁne is the concept of suggestibility. The
ost common deﬁnition is that proposed by Ceci and Bruck (1993):
suggestibility concerns the degree to which children’s encoding,
torage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be inﬂuenced by a
ange of social and psychological factors” (p. 404). Note that the
nclusion of the word “reporting” extends suggestibility to socio-
ultural factors that are non-cognitive, such as pressure on a child
o misreport an experience even though memory processes them-
elves (encoding, storage, and retrieval) are uncontaminated.
uggestibility Does Not Always Decrease with Age
Recent literature on developmental trends in suggestion and
alse memory has provided insight into the differing ways in which
hildren and adults are susceptible to memory distortion. This is
mportant when reviewing testimony. For example, there may  be
 case in which a child and an adult (or two children of different
ges) give contradictory testimony and it is not always true that
he older person’s versions of events are more accurate. In order
o evaluate which testimony is most reliable (accurate), it is neces-
ary to understand the types of memory distortion that may  have
aken place and how this can differentially affect the reliability of
hildren and adults’ testimony.
Chronological age has emerged as a powerful predictor of sug-
estibility: studies have shown that susceptibility to false memory
nd misleading suggestions decrease with age (see Ceci & Bruck,
995; Ceci & Friedman, 2000; Ceci, Kulkofsky, Klemfuss, Sweeney,
 Bruck, 2007), so that young children are most susceptible to
oth misleading suggestions (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; Bjorklund
t al., 2000; Bruck & Ceci, 1999) and false memories (Ackerman,
994; Reyna & Kiernan, 1994). However, as we  explain below,
ecent research has shown that there is much variability within
ge groups. There are some conditions under which there are no
evelopmental effects or even “reverse developmental effects,”
hich are conditions where older children and even adults
re more susceptible to suggestion than younger children
Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland,
 Raymaekers, 2013). For example, Principe, Guiliano, and Root
2008) showed that, because older children are more likely than
ounger children to draw inferences, they are more likely to
alsely report inferences about the causes of ambiguous events
nd mistake them for actual experiences. In this study, 5- to
-year-olds reported more false inferences than did 3-year-olds.
ikewise, Ornstein et al. (1998) found that when asked to recall
he details of an examination by a pediatrician that excluded some
ommonly-occurring medical procedures (e.g., the pediatrician did
ot listen to the child’s heart with a stethoscope as is normally done
uring a doctor’s visit), 6-year-olds were subsequently more likely
han 4-year-olds to wrongly recall expected-but-non-experienced
edical procedures.gía Jurídica 25 (2015) 3–12
Reverse developmental trends are most likely to occur in
situations involving “meaning connection” and semantic asso-
ciation (Brainerd et al., 2008). Younger children may  be less
suggestible in situations where older children possess more
meaning-connectedness knowledge, providing an opportunity for a
suggestion to interact with such knowledge. The role of knowledge-
representation in false memory has been shown to exist in
studies using categorized word lists, such as the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Brainerd et al., 2008). In the DRM
paradigm, children and adults are given a list of words that are
semantically related (e.g., cake, pie, honey, candy, sugar, taste,
sour, chocolate). After the completion of the list, they are asked
to record all of the words they can remember. Studies using the
DRM paradigm have found that it is more likely that adults will
falsely remember a non-presented but related word (e.g., sweet).
This may  occur because sweet is semantically activated by hearing
the other words on the list. Younger children often lack the seman-
tic knowledge to activate sweet in the context of the related words;
therefore, they are less likely to falsely recall hearing it (for a review,
see Brainerd et al., 2008; Brainerd, Reyna, & Zember, 2011).
Recently, the DRM paradigm has been used to develop a greater
understanding of age trends in false memory, for example Khanna
and Cortese (2009) found that there is no age increase in false me-
mory for phonological (as opposed to semantic) lists. Thus, adults
are not more likely to falsely recall a word that rhymes with the ones
they heard. In addition, there is a greater increase in false memo-
ries with age for words evoking negative emotions (e.g., cold, hurt,
sick) than for words evoking positive emotions (e.g., baby, love,
hug; Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010). Furthermore,
when children are instructed to forget a previous word list and
focus on the subsequent list, the rates of remembering words not
presented in the ﬁrst list decreases (Howe, 2005). This beneﬁt of
directed forgetting is not shown in adults.
Reverse developmental trends in suggestibility have been
shown in cases of eyewitness identiﬁcation of an innocent, but
familiar, subject. An experiment by Ross et al. (2006) showed chil-
dren aged 5 to 11 a video depicting either a female teacher reading
a story to children (the control condition) or a male teacher rea-
ding a story to children (the suggestion condition). All the children
were then shown a female teacher entering a cafeteria and having
her wallet stolen by a man  whom the children had not seen before.
Later, the children were asked to identify the thief from a lineup of
four innocent faces and the male teacher who was  reading the story
in the suggestion condition (the real thief was  not in the line up).
For children who had seen the male teacher reading the story, the
probability of falsely identifying this male teacher increased from
0.18 for ﬁve-year-olds to 0.64 for 11-year-olds. Although the male
teacher was familiar to both the 11-year-olds and the ﬁve-year-
olds, the 11-year-olds were more vulnerable to suggestion based
on “conscious inference” (for a deﬁnition, see Read, Tollestrup,
Hammersley, McFazden, & Christensen, 1990; Ross, Ceci, Dunning,
& Toglia, 1994), meaning signiﬁcantly more 11-year-olds falsely
believed they had seen the teacher steal the wallet because he was
familiar to them but they forgot the reason why  he was  familiar.
Similar research on eyewitness identiﬁcation has also found
adults to be less accurate witnesses than children when exposed
to misinformation (Royer, 2014). In this study, participants were
shown a video of a crime and then asked to make an identiﬁcation
from a lineup in which the real perpetrator was  not present. After a
short delay, participants were shown two photographs and asked
to again identify the perpetrator. Participants were randomly
shown two  of the following: the real thief, a completely unfamiliar
face, and the suspect they’d chosen from the ﬁrst lineup. Adults
were less likely than children to correctly identify the real perpe-
trator during the second session. Additionally, adults were more
likely to show commitment to their original choice by reidentifying
Psicología Jurídica 25 (2015) 3–12 5
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he same innocent suspect from the ﬁrst lineup. One potential
xplanation for the decreased performance by adults is that they
ere more susceptible to the misinformation altering their initial
emory traces, and thus came to recognize the innocent suspect
s the true perpetrator.
Recent research has provided additional insight into the rea-
ons for reverse developmental trends, and cases in which it may
ot apply. In a 2007 study, researchers administered a suggestibi-
ity test to four-year-olds and nine-year-olds (Ceci et al., 2007b).
hildren were read a short story and two days later they were
iven incorrect information about several of the objects in the story.
ive to seven days later, children were asked to recall the objects
hat were part of the original story. The study found that seman-
ic distance (children’s representations of the similarity between
he actual and suggested object) was more powerful than chrono-
ogical age as a predictor of suggestibility. Thus, in some cases,
lder children were more susceptible to suggestion than younger
hildren. For example, compared with younger children, older chil-
ren were signiﬁcantly more likely to erroneously report that there
as an orange in a story instead of a grapefruit because they are
oth citrus fruits. Because older children have a citrus dimension
n their mental representation they are more likely to substitute
ne item from the citrus category for another, something younger
hildren do not do because they lack a citrus dimension (see Ceci
t al., 2007b). On the other hand, younger children were more likely
o erroneously report objects that were closer in their semantic
epresentations such as substituting one character in a children’s
ideo for another. This suggests that reverse developmental trends
n false memory based on semantic association may  be caused by
tronger semantic associations as people get older. This is also sup-
orted by results showing that children’s low levels of false memory
or semantically-organized word lists can be increased by mak-
ng semantic associations in the lists more obvious, encouraging
he younger children to process meaning and hence make more
rrors (Carneiro, Fernandez, & Diaz, 2009). However, in general,
lder children and adults have much more semantic knowledge
han younger children and in this case their superior semantic
nowledge actually makes them more vulnerable to false memory.
Further insight has been provided by a series of studies ﬁnding
hat knowledge represented in memory can affect recall, recog-
ition, and even the subprocesses that underpin them, such as
etamemory (Ceci, Fitneva, & Williams, 2010; Ceci et al., 2007b).
ome materials were represented more elaborately or richly by
ounger children (such as Sesame Street television characters whom
ounger children know very well) and other materials were repre-
ented more elaborately by older children (e.g., items that belong
o categories such as predatory animals, citrus fruits, or dairy
oods). When viewed against this backdrop, those who  possessed
ore elaborate representations of the items (which was  some-
imes younger and sometimes older children) were almost always
ore suggestible. In Figure 1, we show the typical representation
f a 9-year-old. As can be seen, suggesting something that is near
n experienced item results in greater suggestibility errors than
uggesting something far away. For example, suggesting to a nine-
ear-old that they saw a lemon would result in greater errors if they
ctually saw an orange (because they possess a citrus dimension
hat links both items) whereas a four-year-old is less likely to make
his suggestibility error because they do not understand the citrus
imension. Although it is not shown in this ﬁgure, a four-year-old
s more likely to claim they saw milk when they actually saw soda
ecause in their representation both items are closely linked as
things to drink”, whereas a nine-year-old links milk closer to dairy
tems (cheese, butter). The bottom line is that the way children
epresent their world inﬂuences what suggestions cause errors.
Thus, depending on how they represented the materials,
hildren were differentially suggestible and their metamemoryFigure 1. A spatial depiction of a typical 9-year-old’s representation of a set of ani-
mals and foods. The proximity between words represents how closely related the
child  believes these objects are.
(thinking about their own memories) was differentially effective.
When older children’s representation of material was  elaborate,
they were more suggestible than were younger children whose
representation was not elaborate. The reverse was  true of items
whose representations were more elaborate for younger children
(see Table 1 of Ceci et al., 2007b, for targeted predictions that were
conﬁrmed for both age trends and reverse age trends as a result
of how older and younger children represented the same mate-
rial). The bottom line is that the nature and richness of the way
information is represented inﬂuences proneness to suggestibility.
Sometimes this can lead to older individuals being more suggestible
than younger ones.
These ﬁndings are highly signiﬁcant forensically. They mean
that in some situations children’s evidence may  be less likely than
adult’s evidence to be tainted by suggestion or false memory. This
necessitates a more reﬁned approach in reviewing of testimony
and in forensic examination, taking into account the subject mat-
ter, how elaborately it would be represented by witnesses, any
semantic associations the witness may  have made, and the type of
potential memory distortions. These factors are likely to be more
important than age itself in predicting memory distortion.
Demographic Variables Are Not Consistent Predictors of
Suggestibility
As illustrated by the reverse developmental trends in sug-
gestibility, interviewers should not assume an individual is more
or less vulnerable to all forms of suggestion based on demographic
variables. Research examining race, socioeconomic status, and gen-
der have lead to inconsistent results that are better explained by
other factors such as language ability.
Race and Socioeconomic Status
Very few studies have considered race or socioeconomic sta-
tus as an inﬂuence on suggestibility and false memory (Bruck
& Melnyk, 2004). Race is often tied to measures of intelligence
and even language. For instance, Kulkofsky (2010) cites several
studies that reveal a correlation between socioeconomic back-
grounds and a child’s language and intellectual abilities (Patterson,
Kupersmidt, & Vaden, 1990; Vernon-Feagans, Hammer, Miccio, &
Manlove, 2002; Walker, Greenwood, Hart, & Carta, 1994). She also
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ighlights the concern with racial discrepancies in language abi-
ities. Because minority-raced children (e.g., Latino/Hispanic and
frican-American in the United States) are commonly over-
epresented as witnesses in criminal proceedings (Kulkofsky,
010), substandard verbal skills should be of great concern to inves-
igators. Nonetheless, more research must be conducted before any
esponsible conclusions can be drawn concerning racial inﬂuences
n suggestibility and false memories.
ender
In their review of research on individual differences in chil-
ren’s suggestibility, Bruck and Melnyk (2004) identiﬁed 20 studies
hat examined gender and suggestibility, of which only four found
igniﬁcant differences–and the results of these four studies were
nconsistent. Other studies have found that there is a contextual
elation between gender and suggestibility in children. In a study
xploring individual differences in suggestibility, Chae and Ceci
2005) found that, during cued recall, girls gave more accurate
esponses than boys. In another study exploring the relationship
etween child and interviewer gender, researchers observed that
irls provided more information when asked directed questions
osed by female interviewers rather than male interviewers (Lamb
 Garretson, 2003). In contrast, boys did not differ in their respon-
ing to male or female interviewers. Other research suggests that
oys may  be more suggestible than girls (e.g., Crossman, 2001; War-
en, Lane, Snyder-Boggs, & Blevins, 1995, as cited in Bruck & Melnyk,
004). However, some studies suggest that girls may  be more sug-
estible than boys (e.g., McFarlane, Powell, & Dudgeon, 2002, as
ited in Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). Thus, there does not appear to be
onsistent gender differences across varied situations.
lternatively, Some Individual Differences May  Impact
uggestibility
Although some demographic variables are not reliable predic-
ors of suggestibility, other individual differences appear to be
onsistently related to suggestibility. These variables are important
o explore for both applied and theoretical reasons. They inform
nterviewers about when to be cautious about the types of inter-
iewing techniques they utilize. In addition, as was  illustrated
ith representational complexity theory, they suggest underlying
echanisms impacting suggestibility.
ognitive Factors
A wealth of research has explored the relation between cog-
itive function and suggestibility in children. Results from several
tudies suggest that higher cognitive functioning is associated with
ewer memory inaccuracies than lower cognitive functioning (e.g.,
hae, Goodman, Eisen, & Qin, 2011; Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis,
 Crayton, 2007; Karpinski & Scullin, 2009). For example, in one
tudy by Eisen et al. (2007), cognitive functioning (a composite
f short-term memory, intelligence, and language ability) signif-
cantly predicted correct responses to open-ended questions and
ree recall and was associated with so-called “commission errors”
claiming something occurred that did not) to speciﬁc and mislead-
ng questions. In contrast, cognitive ability in this study was not
elated to “omission errors” (failing to report something occurred
hich actually did occur). Therefore, it is important that forensic
nterviewers assess children’s cognitive abilities during the inves-
igative process, as this ability may  be associated with susceptibility
o suggestibility and memory errors.
One particular cognitive function that would seem to be foren-
ically relevant is memory ability. Several studies have examined
he possible relation between memory ability and suggestibilitygía Jurídica 25 (2015) 3–12
in children. Generally, results are inconsistent: while some studies
found a signiﬁcant relation between memory performance and sug-
gestibility, others did not. For example, Brown found that increased
memory ability was actually associated with higher rates of event
creation compared to lower memory ability (as cited in Bruck &
Melnyk, 2004, p. 965). Researchers have also explored the relation
between event memory and suggestibility and have found incon-
sistent results. Generally, it appears that children’s event memory
proﬁciency is not signiﬁcantly related to suggestibility (Bruck &
Melnyk, 2004). Perhaps those children who are best at creating
events are the most imaginative, hence suggestible. We  do not
know at this time.
Past research yields very consistent results that indicate chil-
dren with intellectual disabilities are more prone to errors
than typically-developing children when they are presented with
closed, misleading questions (Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003; Bruck
& Melnyk, 2004). In addition, several studies indicate that there
are often no differences between children with mental retarda-
tion and typically-developing children on accuracy of misleading,
open-ended questions (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). However, when
considering the relation between IQ and suggestibility for typically-
developing children only, the association between suggestibility
and IQ is inconsistent (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). Age may  account for
more of the variability in suggestibility for children with normal IQ.
Distracted children may  process information less effectively,
causing them to confuse actual experiences with suggested
information or to impulsively assent to suggestive questions. Unex-
pectedly, few studies have found a speciﬁc correlation between
suggestibility and distractibility (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). A recent
study did ﬁnd that levels of attention may  impact adult’s vulnera-
bility to suggestibility, but not children’s (Otgaar, Peters, & Howe,
2012). Otgaar et al. (2012) found that divided attention decreased
false memory frequency in children but increased false memory fre-
quency in adults for both negative and neutral information. Because
attention may  differentially impact children’s recall of information,
attention should be considered during investigative interviews of
child abuse.
In addition, researchers have explored the relation between
suggestibility and executive function, those frontal-lobe mediated
activities that include inhibiting impulses, monitoring memory,
working memory, and tracking performance. Theoretically, execu-
tive functioning should be correlated with suggestion because both
involve keeping track of original events and resisting subsequent
contradictory information related to the events. Researchers
often explored this connection using tasks focused on various
sub-components of executive functioning. Many studies revealed a
signiﬁcant relation between executive function and suggestibility,
but others have revealed non-signiﬁcant results or signiﬁcant
results in the non-predicted direction (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004).
Some of these results may  be qualiﬁed by further examination
on the impact of age on suggestibility: younger children, who
are still developing executive function, may  be more prone to
suggestibility. These results may  indicate that age rather than
executive function is related to suggestibility.
Several studies have investigated the correlation between
creativity and suggestibility. Results indicate that highly creative
children with active imaginations are more likely to elaborate on
false beliefs and to be suggestible than children with less creativity
and imagination. High creativity and imagination was  associated
with increases in answers to misleading questions, misinformation,
and the creation of false events (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004).Language
Recent years of research have produced the greatest under-
standing on key developmental differences between child and adult
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itnesses. One of the most apparent disparities is in language
evelopment. Language abilities have been closely tied to ques-
ions of child competency and the reliability of their testimony. For
nstance, several studies have supported an inverse relationship
etween a child’s linguistic skills and their vulnerability to sugges-
ion (Chae & Ceci, 2005; Clarke-Stewart, Malloy, & Allhusen, 2004;
anielsdottir, Sigurgeirsdottir, Einarsdottir, & Haraldsson, 1993;
ulkofsky & Klemfuss, 2008; McFarlane et al., 2002; Newcombe
 Dour, 2001; Roebers & Schneider, 2005). One possible expla-
ation is that higher aptitude in language production is closely
elated to higher degrees of comprehension. This linguistic advan-
age facilitates the processing of new information and increases the
ikelihood the child will encode the event into memory (Ornstein,
aden, & Hedrick, 2004). Taken together, an emerging line of
esearch proposes that language abilities should be considered by
orensic interviewers as a factor affecting child suggestibility that
s independent of other measures of cognitive functioning such as
Q.
How is language conceptualized as an individual difference?
anguage skill is often measured through vocabulary assessments,
uch as the Vocabulary subtest of the Weschler’s Intelligence Test
or Children (Danielsdottir et al., 1993; Howe, Gagnon, & Thouas
2008); Newcombe & Dour, 2001) or the Peabody Picture Vocabu-
ary Test (Dunn & Dunn, 2007; Kulkofsky, 2010). Several studies
hat investigated the relationship between language ability and
uggestibility have found that increased ability is positively cor-
elated with increased resistance to suggestion (Bruck & Melnyk,
004; Danielsdottir et al., 1993).
A mechanism that may  be driving the relationship between lan-
uage ability and suggestion is the ability to speak about memories.
ower vocabulary skills are associated with a reduction of informa-
ion provided by a child when asked for free recall (Chae & Ceci,
005; Kulkofsky, 2010). Furthermore, children with more accurate
ued recall were less suggestible than those with less accurate recall
Chae & Ceci, 2005). In addition, suggestibility has been found to be
ighest for children with below-average verbal intelligence.
Although providing child witnesses with a vocabulary “boot
amp” or intensive linguistic training may  not be a practical solu-
ion, several researchers have proposed methods to work within
he limitations of the current system. Brown and Pipe (2003)
roposed a modiﬁcation of the narrative elaboration technique, a
ethod called the verbal labels procedure. Findings have shown
hat this method is able to counteract some of the predispositions
o suggestibility stemming from low vocabulary skills (Brown &
ipe, 2003). A narrower attribute of the English language that
as received attention is linguistic referents. This refers to a
hild’s use of productive (article system, number speciﬁcation,
nd semantic mapping of words) and receptive (ﬁltering and
ppropriately responding to confusing and misleading questions)
kills. Findings indicate young children failed to correct false sug-
estions, while most children had a misidentiﬁcation (78%) under
arious conditions (Battin, Ceci & Lust, 2012). In this research,
reschool-aged children were especially prone to describing a
erpetrator in the plural (“They knocked over the cans”) when
n actuality it was a single perpetrator. Perhaps, the use of the
lural in English lessened the negativity in the children’s minds by
iffusing responsibility among a group of individuals rather than
 single perpetrator. Forensic interviewers would be well-served
o precede their interviewers with preschool-aged children with
 short session to instruct them to use the deﬁnite article (the)
ather than the indeﬁnite (a) and to use singular rather than plural
hen referring to a unique individual.
Finally, future research is greatly needed to determine how
uggestibility and false memory effects differ for bilingual and
on-native English speaking children. Howe et al. (2008) have
egun to investigate how false memories vary in bilingual speakersgía Jurídica 25 (2015) 3–12 7
(including measures of language exposure and proﬁciency). Results
indicate that false memory development was more prevalent for
bilingual speakers regardless of age. These ﬁndings collectively
illustrate language as a complex, multifaceted factor affecting sug-
gestibility.
Mental State
Forensic interviews, especially relating to child abuse, are highly
emotional and stressful events for children. Stress may  affect chil-
dren’s encoding as well as retrieval of their abuse. In addition,
children with different temperaments and attachment styles may
be more greatly affected by stress.
Research has shown that parental attachment style is related to
suggestibility in certain contexts. For example, researchers found
that children’s inaccurate responses to direct questioning were
predicted by parental insecurity (Quas et al., 1999). Children of
fearful avoidant parents made more omission errors to misleading
questioning than children of parents who did not display as fearful
and avoidant attachment styles. Further, children whose parents
displayed dismissive avoidant attachment exhibited increased
suggestibility compared to children whose parents displayed
less dismissive avoidant attachment styles (Quas et al., 1999). In
addition, research suggests that securely attached children are
less suggestible than those who are insecurely attached (Bruck
& Melnyk, 2004). Given that parental attachment may impact
children’s susceptibility to misinformation and suggestion, the
investigative interview should be conducted in manner that takes
these factors into consideration, including an assessment of the
child’s and parent’s attachment style.
Research suggests that stress may  impact children’s suscepti-
bility to false suggestions during both the encoding and retrieval of
information. In one study, the impact of stress was examined when
children were interviewed about distressing medical visits. Results
indicated that for children with avoidant parents, high distress
during the medical visit led to increased memory inaccuracy while
children with less avoidant parents were more accurate regardless
of stress level (Chae et al., 2014). In another example, increased
stress was related to less detailed responses during interviews
with children about a medical procedure they had experienced
years earlier (Quas et al., 1999). Quas et al. (1999) also found that
increased stress levels were related to greater accuracy during
misleading questioning. This unexpected ﬁnding may  be due to
the fact that the medical procedure varied across children and
therefore perceived stress may  not have been consistent. A lack
of empirical control may  also explain the ﬁndings in other studies
that higher levels of stress or arousal are associated with decreased
suggestibility (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). In addition, a positive
relationship between stress and suggestibility may  not be found
in studies where children do not experience high stress levels
(Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). Thus, children’s level of experienced
stress during the investigative process may  differentially impact
children’s ability to encode and recall information in different
contexts, although results across studies are highly inconsistent.
Emotionality has also been linked to suggestibility but, as will
be seen, the ﬁndings have been contradictory. In Chae and Ceci
(2005), children with high emotionality (or neuroticism) complied
more with interviewers’ suggestions than did less emotional chil-
dren. However, Chae (as cited in Bruck & Melnyk, 2004) found
that highly emotional children were more prone to suggestibility,
but this relationship diminished when age was  controlled. Further,
other research suggests an opposite relationship: Scullin (as cited
in Bruck & Melnyk, 2004) and Chen (as cited in Bruck & Melnyk,
2004) found that highly emotional children were less susceptible
to suggestion. Thus, the ﬁndings are inconsistent for the relation
between emotionality and susceptibility to suggestion.
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Several aspects of self-concept may  also be related to sug-
estibility in children. For example, Chae and Ceci (2005) found that
hy children produced less voluntary recall and produced fewer
orrect answers to non-leading, direct questions compared to less
hy children. In addition, Vrij and Bush (2000) investigated the rela-
ion between self-conﬁdence and suggestibility in children. Results
ndicated that after controlling for age, self-conﬁdence signiﬁcantly
redicted suggestibility. Other studies also indicate that high levels
f self-concept may  be associated with decreased suggestibility
Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). Bruck and Melnyk (2004) suggested
hat attachment style and self-concept may  interact, such that
hildren raised by secure and supportive parents may  develop
ositive self-concepts, which in turn make them more resistant
o suggestions that are inconsistent with their own  experiences.
ore research is necessary to fully explore this relationship.
ulture
Little attention has been given to cultural inﬂuences on sug-
estibility. Siegal (1996) highlights a few ways a child’s culture
an inﬂuence their testimony. For instance, a child may  hesitate
o reveal abuse if the consequences appear more damaging than
he continuation of harm (Berliner & Barbieri, 1984). For example,
 mother may  threaten her child that if she tells the police that
er father sexually abused her, the father will go to jail and the
hild will go to an orphanage. Another cultural impact may  come
n the form of social judgments. Social Judgment Theory, crafted by
herif and Hovland (1961) proposed that a person appraises a situa-
ion by beginning with their preferred position, then negotiates the
ovel facts with the ego to arrive at the ﬁnal judgment. Brothers and
ing (1992) proposed that social judgments are affected on some
evel by culture. Therefore, when determining the factors that may
nﬂuence a child’s response during an interview, it is important
o remember that cultural forces may  be bearing weight on the
esponses disclosed.
Siegal (1996) also discusses how culture molds the conversa-
ional styles that can affect a child’s autobiographical memory.
lthough a witness interview is seldom perceived as a casual
onversation, there are several qualities of an autobiographical
emory that make both acts strikingly similar, such as the need
or free recall and recognition. These conversational attributes
an vary signiﬁcantly among various cultural groups. Western
ultures’ individualistic natures are strikingly different from the
ollectivistic conception of Japanese culture, even in terms of one’s
ind (Kashima, 1994). The notion of a mind molded by others
llows for memory talk, where a person’s experiences are freely
hared, heightening the development of a child’s autobiographical
emory. Memory talk has a particularly signiﬁcant effect on the
ree recall of preschoolers, with signiﬁcant implications for false
elief tasks (Chandler & Hala, 1994).
It is important to note that certain cultures participate in
onversation as a routine cultural practice, developing a better
nderstanding of mental states due to the need for memory,
ensitivity, honesty, intelligence, and courage (Siegal, 1996). An
mproved awareness of mental states has led to better performance
n false belief tasks, appreciating that others have beliefs that may
iffer from your own and that motivate their questioning (Dunn,
994). In spite of limited associations between culture and chil-
ren, these ﬁndings propose its inﬂuence on suggestibility and false
emories could begin earlier than previously considered. When an
nterviewer asks a young child in the course of a murder investi-
ation if he can remember if his father had a knife when he left
he house, the child must recognize not only that others regard
er as having an obligation to speak accurately but equally impor-
antly that her statement may  cause serious adverse consequences
or another person (her father). This is why it is so important togía Jurídica 25 (2015) 3–12
understand that others have beliefs that may  differ from your own
and that motivate their questioning. Without this understanding,
a child may  tell an interviewer what she assumes the interviewer
wants to hear, simply to terminate what may  be an uncomfortable
discussion.
Even One Suggestive Interview Can Create False Memories
A number of studies demonstrate that repeated suggestive
interviews taint the accuracy of children’s memories (e.g., Bruck,
Ceci, Francoeur, & Barr, 1995; Bruck, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 2002;
Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). Many studies have also reported that
children can incorporate suggestions about salient events after a
single suggestive interview (e.g., Ceci et al., 2007a). In one study,
Hritz (2014) found that asking children to knowingly make a false
accusation in one interview caused a third of the children to main-
tain the false accusation during a later neutral interview, even after
being told the ﬁrst interviewer had made a mistake.
Current research has explored how a single suggestive inter-
view can have equally detrimental effects as multiple interviews
when (1) the strength of the original memory trace is weak or the
memory is of repeated events and (2) the timing of the misinfor-
mation occurs relatively close to the original event compared to
the time from the memory test. These ﬁndings illustrate the impor-
tance of evaluating every interview with a child, as even one biased
interviewer can taint a child’s testimony.
Strength of Original Memory Trace
The memory trace strength theory proposes that children with
better memory for an event are less suggestible to misinforma-
tion about that event (e.g., Bruck & Melnyk, 2004; Marche, 1999;
Marche & Howe, 1995; Pezdek & Roe, 1995). This theory has been
consistently supported in the literature. For example, after showing
children a slide show multiple times (and thus strengthening their
memory of the slide show), Marche (1999) found that these chil-
dren reported less misinformation than children who saw the slide
show only once and thus had a weaker memory for it. In addition,
children who experienced the event once were equally suscepti-
ble to misinformation if it was presented in only one interview
compared to multiple interviews. This suggests that a single sug-
gestive interview can have detrimental effects on the accuracy of
the reports of children with weaker memories of an event.
Recent research suggests a relationship may  exist between sug-
gestibility and the effect that repeated events have on memory (e.g.,
Brainerd et al., 2008). For example, Price and Connolly (2013) found
that children who experienced a repeated event were more likely to
be suggestible to false details than children who  only experienced
a single event. This suggestibility effect was still present after one
year. Price and Connolly (2013) hypothesized that the children who
experienced repeated events had a stronger general representation
of the events (as opposed to a speciﬁc memory), and were therefore
more likely to accept plausible misinformation as accurate.
Delay Between Event and Interviews
Another factor that inﬂuences the impact of a suggestive inter-
view is the timing of the interview after the original event. Studies
have shown that neutral open-ended interviews immediately after
an event can have a positive impact on children’s accuracy (Howe,
1991; Lehman et al., 2010; Marche & Howe, 1995). Trace-integrity
theory suggests that this is because the neutral interview can
strengthen the child’s original memory. An immediate neutral
interview can consolidate memory for an event and thus protect
against forgetting, prevent normally occurring errors of commis-
sion, promote reporting of previously unmentioned details in later
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ecall, or facilitate hypermnesia, an increase in the amount of
ew information recalled over increasing retention intervals that
xceeds the amount of information forgotten (for a review, see
elnyk & Bruck, 2004). The protective effect of an early neu-
ral interview would not occur if the original memory trace is
eakened, or at least not strengthened, by the introduction of mis-
nformation through a biased interview.
Recent research has explored the impact of a single biased
nterview performed shortly after the event. The theory of trace
trength suggests that extending the interval between event and
isinformation increases the likelihood of suggestibility because
he biased interview has a recency advantage over the event (the
etails of the event have more opportunity to be forgotten), so
isinformation is more likely to be preserved at time of the test
e.g. Bright-Paul & Jarrold, 2009). Alternatively, source monitoring
heory suggests that shortening interval between event and misin-
ormation increases likelihood of suggestibility because when the
vent and the biased interview are close in proximity, the infor-
ation gained from these two events is more likely to be confused
Bright-Paul & Jarrold, 2009). A third possibility, temporal distinc-
iveness theory, suggests that it is the ratio of the time between the
xperienced event and subsequent exposure to misinformation to
he time between exposure to misinformation and the test of the
xperienced memory that is important. This is because as the lat-
er increases, the former becomes relatively less distinguishable
Bright-Paul & Jarrold, 2009). For example, it is harder to discrimi-
ate between 21 and 24 months than bewteen one and four months
ven though the time difference is the same. This also ﬁts with
ource-monitoring theory, as it is more likely that individuals will
onfuse information gained from the event with information from
he suggestive interview when temporal distinctiveness decreases.
n support of this theory, Bright-Paul and Jarrold (2009) found that
hen the time between misinformation and memory recall was
ncreased compared to the time between event and misinforma-
ion, participants were more suggestible. Interestingly, their results
ndicated that the total delay between the event and the ﬁnal inter-
iew did not impact suggestibility.
Melnyk and Bruck (2004) examined the extent to which
iming moderates the impact of repeated interviews. For example,
ne suggestive interview could have the same impact as two
nterviews depending on when each interview occurs. Results
ndicated that one suggestive interview, when isolated from the
peciﬁc inﬂuences of timing, had the same effect on the accuracy
f children’s recall as multiple interviews. When the timing was
anipulated so the suggestive interview was either very close to
he event, very close to the ﬁnal neutral interview, or there were
wo suggestive interviews, repetition did play a role; participants
ere most suggestible when they experienced two interviews.
mportantly, all three groups incorporated the misinformation
nto their accounts, suggesting there should be cause for concern
ven when only one suggestive interview has occurred.
The results of these ﬁndings suggest that even when sugges-
ive techniques are not used in subsequent interviews, suggestions
ntroduced previously may  still inﬂuence children’s responses. An
mplication of this ﬁnding is that forensic interviewers should
ttempt to ﬁnd out if a child has been suggestively interviewed
n the past, either in formal interviews with police and social ser-
ices or in informal conversations with members of their family
nd neighborhood.
ven Professionals Cannot Differentiate Between False and
ccurate Reports
Research has demonstrated children can speak sincerely and
motionally about events that never occurred and appear muchgía Jurídica 25 (2015) 3–12 9
like children providing accurate reports (Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, &
Bruck, 1994; Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). In one study, Kassin, Tubb,
Hosch, and Memon  (2001) surveyed 64 eyewitness experts in the
United States about basic eyewitness topics and two-thirds of the
respondents reported that young children were less accurate than
adults. However, this is not always the case. As with many eye-
witness topics, the reliability and credibility of child eyewitness
reports depend on a multitude of other factors, such as the inclusion
of yes or no questions, repeated questioning, or even the anatomi-
cal dolls used during questioning (Ceci & Bruck, 1995). The belief
among experts that children are less reliable witnesses than adults
may  compromise the retrieval of accurate information from child
witnesses.
Conﬁrmatory Bias
It has been shown that people have the tendency to be biased
towards information that conﬁrms their own  personal beliefs,
rejecting information that disagrees with those beliefs (Goodman &
Melinder, 2007). This tendency has been demonstrated even among
professionals and social scientists. A person’s established beliefs are
often difﬁcult to change and resist contradictory evidence (Ross,
Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). This phenomenon, referred to as “conﬁr-
mation bias”, can have especially detrimental effects when working
with child witnesses. If an interviewer enters a room, prepared to
question a child, and brings along pre-established beliefs about the
case or the accuracy and credibility of the child, the interviewer
may  unintentionally put disproportional weight on some state-
ments the child makes while ignoring others. If the interviewer’s
initial suspicions are incorrect, this could create a false report. Con-
ﬁrmation bias is potentially a problem for all people who may
interact with a child witness, even professionals in the ﬁeld of
forensics, human development, and social science. In fact, experts
tend to be more conﬁdent in their evaluations of witnesses than
others, despite not necessarily being more skilled at distinguishing
accurate from inaccurate statements (DePaulo et al., 2003; Wessel,
Drevland, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2006).
Interviewer bias can develop quickly in natural interviewing sit-
uations, and contaminate not only the child’s accuracy but also the
accuracy of the interviewer. In a study by Bruck et al. (1999) a sur-
prise birthday party was staged for 90 preschool children in their
school. In groups of three, the children surprised a research assis-
tant for her birthday, played games, ate food, and watched magic
tricks. Another 30 children were also told that it was  the assis-
tant’s birthday, however they did not attend the birthday party but
instead they colored a picture with the research assistant. Univer-
sity graduate students in programs in social work or counseling
and who  had training and experience in interviewing children each
interviewed four children about what had happened. They were not
told about the events but were simply told to ﬁnd out from each
child what had happened. The ﬁrst three children that each inter-
viewer questioned attended the birthday party but the fourth child
attended the coloring event. Several weeks later, the interviewers
were questioned about what they had learned from the children.
Bruck et al. (1999) found that the children who were inter-
viewed last (all of whom attended the coloring event) produced
twice as many errors as the children who  actually attended the
birthday party; 60% of the children who only colored made false
claims that involved attending a birthday party. This result suggests
that the interviewers had built up an expectation that all the chil-
dren had attended a birthday party. By the time they interviewed
the fourth child in their group, they structured their interviews in
such a way as to elicit claims consistent with their expectation. Thus
if interviewers have the belief that all the children they interview
have experienced a certain event, then it is probable that many
of the children will come to make such claims even though they
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ere non-participants (or non-victims). Interestingly, even when
he child who only colored correctly denied attending a birthday
arty, 84% of their interviewers reported later that all the children
old them they had attended a birthday party. These data suggest
hat regardless of what children actually say, conﬁrmatory bias
eads interviewers to inaccurately report the child’s claims in order
o make them consistent with their own hypotheses.
To counteract this conﬁrmation bias, researchers have recom-
ended that interviewers questioning a child about an event
hould test alternative hypotheses about what may  have hap-
ened. For example, if the interviewer believes a parent abused
he child, the interviewer should also ask questions that allow
he child to disclose information that could suggest the parent is
nnocent such as asking about whether a neighbor or babysitter
bused them. Testing alternative hypotheses is important because
here are many situations in which a child’s statements may
e misunderstood, even in the absence of blatant suggestive
uestioning or situations in which a child gives the interviewer
he answer they assume the latter wants to hear.
Some interviewers appear to believe that behavior when
iving a false or suggested statement is distinguishable from
ehavior when telling a true statement. If an interviewer believes
here are certain behaviors a truth-teller displays that a child
elling misinformation would not, they may  not naturally explore
lternative options during the interview when a child displays
hese behaviors. However, research shows people are unable
o distinguish false reports made by children from true reports.
hildren who have been interviewed suggestively and report false
nformation are later rated as highly credible, even by trained
rofessionals in child development, mental health, and forensic
nterviews (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). In fact, children who  give
alse reports can speak sincerely and even emotionally about the
vent, much like some children giving true reports (Ceci et al.,
994; Leichtman & Ceci, 1995).
In one study, children were interviewed about a man  who
isited their classroom (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). Some of the
hildren were interviewed suggestively about the man’s behavior,
hile some were told negative stereotypes about man, and others
ere given no suggestion at all. Afterwards, videos of three
ifferent children’s interviews about the man’s behavior were
hown to adults who were asked to rate the accuracy of claims
ade by children. Many of the claims made by the children did
ot happen. Only one of the children told the truth about how the
an behaved. Adults were unable to correctly identify which of
he events had occurred, and furthermore rated the truth-telling
hild as the least credible of the three witnesses.
A study conducted by Bruck et al. (2002) included multiple
ighly suggestive interviews of preschool-aged children about both
rue and ﬁctional events and found that children gave additional
nformation in their false reports beyond what was suggested to
hem. In fact, children who  were questioned about false narratives
ctually gave more details and lengthy embellishments than chil-
ren who were questioned about a true event they had actually
xperienced. Additionally, linguistic markers such as elaboration
id not consistently differentiate false narratives from true stories.
n a real life context, this may  be problematic because children may
nterweave false suggestion with details about their life and their
eal interactions with the suspected perpetrator. If the interviewer
xpects children to be reticent to discuss an event that did not occur,
hey may  likely believe a child who goes into great detail, even if
hat child is not accurate.
While children do not always generate false statements when
sked speciﬁc, misleading questions, they also do not always
rovide truthful, accurate information when they speak sponta-
eously, that is, in the absence of any misleading questions (Poole
 Lindsay, 2001; Poole & White, 1993). As long as children aregía Jurídica 25 (2015) 3–12
exposed to suggestive questioning, they can later spontaneously
report the suggested information despite best practices followed
by subsequent interviewers. This is demonstrated when children
are asked open-ended questions after suggestive interviewing has
occurred. In one study in which children were asked to give a free
recall of everything they remembered about an event after being
given misleading information about the event by their parents, 21%
of statements made by children contained suggested false infor-
mation (Poole & Lindsay, 2001). This spontaneous generation of
false information can even occur after a long delay between the
suggested interview and the free memory recall. In another study,
children were subjected to repeat suggestive questioning about an
event (Poole & White, 1993). Two years later, the children were
asked to report everything they remembered from the event: 39%
of six-year-olds and 23% of ten-year-olds reported incorrect infor-
mation.
Even if no suggestion has occurred, spontaneous reports made
by children are not necessarily accurate. As discussed previously,
confusing or ambiguous events may  spur spontaneous false me-
mories for related events. In one study, children were inter-
viewed after a mock medical exam in which certain common
features (e.g., a doctor listen to their heart examined with a stetho-
scope) of an exam were left out and some unusual features (e.g.,
having the circumference of their wrists measured) were added
(Ornstein et al., 1998). When questioned after the event, 42%
of four-year-olds and 74% of six-year-olds reported to remem-
ber experiences common to medical exams that had not in fact
occurred. Thus, while responses to free-recall and spontaneous
statements are indeed more likely to be accurate than responses
to direct questioning, children may  indeed report incorrect infor-
mation spontaneously.
As already noted, it is important to not discount a child’s tes-
timony merely because they have been exposed to suggestive
questioning. Misinformation has been found to actually increase
memory accuracy in certain contexts when a child’s memory for
the event is obviously different from the misinformation, as was
found by Peterson, Parsons, and Dean (2004). In that study, chil-
dren were suggestively interviewed about an emergency medical
procedure they had just undergone. After a two-year delay, none
of the children reported experiencing the suggested information
and their memory for the medical procedure was  intact. In situ-
ations like this, the false information may  reinforce memory for
the true event and the child may  therefore give a more accurate
report.
Conclusion
The importance of conducting forensic interviews that are free
from bias and misleading information is immense. As illustrated
by the research discussed in this paper, all people are suscepti-
ble to interviewers’ suggestions. In addition, while research has
identiﬁed some of the underlying mechanisms that cause sug-
gestibility, results are often inconsistent. These ﬁndings highlight
the importance of interviewers having an open mind and consi-
dering alternative theories of the events, as even one suggestive
interview can taint an individual’s reports years later and even
highly trained professionals are not able to differentiate reports
based on true and false beliefs. Future forensic experts would
be well-served to examine the child’s language, theory of mind,
and emotional attachment prior to conducting the actual inter-
view and to prepare a line of questioning that tests alternative
hypotheses. Armed with such information, the interviewer can
better understand any limitations and hopefully intervene to sur-
mount them.
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